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a sectoral, problem-driven approach to regulation”. 
This paper will map out and critically evaluate some 
current sectoral (read vertical) regulatory develop-
ments, which may affect intermediary liability. It will 
look at recent, more top-down approaches proposed 
by the EU (e.g. in copyright), as well as self-regula-
tory efforts. This will be compared to less publicized 
developments, which have notably taken place in 
the area of product and financial regulation affecting 
ecommerce, such as for example efforts to combat 
the sale of fake medicines, unsafe products online, or 
anti-money laundering compliance. In these areas, it 
is argued that regulatory authorities have more pro-
actively engaged online platforms, both on a legisla-
tive and practical level. A special focus in this context 
will be on the role of reasonable duties of care which 
intermediaries may be required to apply in order to 
detect and prevent infringements. Could these more 
“grassroots” developments and the convergence of 
online and offline worlds provide blueprints to en-
courage the development of a new content liability 
framework based on sectoral duties of care?
Abstract:  The EU’s current regulatory frame-
work for the content liability of online intermediar-
ies was created in 2000 with the E-Commerce Direc-
tive (ECD). Already in those days, during the run-up 
to the ECD, there was an intense debate regarding 
whether a light-touch approach or more stringent 
content liability regime for intermediaries would be 
the appropriate way forward. 20 years later the de-
bate is essentially led from the same angle, but has 
predictably, increased in complexity as the internet 
makes massive strides in transforming the “offline” 
world. There are those who argue that a purely hori-
zontal approach in regulating internet intermediaries, 
or online platforms, remains sufficient. Others think 
the time has come to reflect the disruptive entrances 
online platforms made in various sectors of society 
in more vertical changes affecting substantive law. 
The EU Commission sits on the fence it seems, how-
ever. In its communication on online platforms and 
the digital single market, the Commission announced 
last year that it would leave the current intermediary 
liability regime as it is for now “while implementing 
A. Introduction†
1 The debate over internet regulation began 
since the internet started to make an increasing 
impact on culture and the economy. As a purely 
illustrative example, a contribution from 1995 by 
Euan Cameron & Caitriona Hegarty1 argued that 
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existing substantive law was apt to deal with the 
transformations introduced by the internet and that 
the main challenge would be one of enforcement. 
For copyright - which is one of the more prominent 
examples discussed - the paper submits that 
rights owners who take advantage of the new 
infrastructures should be left with the task of looking 
1 Caitriona Hegarty and Euan Cameron, ‘Case for Minimal 
Regulation of Electronic Network Communications’ 
<http://bileta.ac.uk/content/files/conference%20
papers/1995/Case%20for%20Minimal%20Regulation%20
of%20Electronic%20Network%20Communications.pdf> 
accessed 3 January 2017.
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after enforcement challenges posed by new means 
of exploitation. The traditional distinction between 
service provider and facility user may be blurred 
by the internet - a smart prevision of the debate 
over the “neutral” and “passive” character of an 
information service provider, culminating in L’Oréal 
v eBay2 15 years later. Finally, regulation, according 
to the paper, should be kept to a minimum to allow 
the internet to flourish. Self-regulation would be the 
most suitable means to facilitate experimentation 
and new possibilities of global connectivity and 
expression.
2 One could argue that this view was borne out in the 
EU E-Commerce Directive in 2000,3 which established 
general and horizontally available conditions under 
which an information service provider (ISP) could be 
held liable for content posted on its network.
3 Substantive law on copyright was indeed adapted to 
electronic communications developments in 1996, 
one year after the appearance of the above article, 
when the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties4 introduced 
the public communication and distribution rights. 
These were then introduced into EU law by the 
InfoSoc Directive5 in 2001.
4 However, even those early days were not free from 
considerations of a more hands-on regulatory 
approach towards the information transmitted and 
hosted by online intermediaries. The reasons for this 
were principally based on a logic, which looked to 
retrospective responsibility in the absence of other 
suitable actors.6 It was based on the central role 
online intermediaries played as gatekeepers and 
infrastructure providers for various forms of content. 
The internet posed an entirely new regulatory 
challenge because it made matters of jurisdiction, 
detection and enforcement more complex. With 
the prospect of individuals’ prosecution being of 
small effect and perpetrators difficult to get hold 
2 L’Oréal (UK) Ltd v eBay International AG, eBay Europe SARL, eBay 
(UK) Ltd and others, C-324/09 [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:474 (CJEU).
3 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the 
Internal Market, OJ L 187 2000.
4 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (1996), in particular Art. 8 WCT.
5 Directive 2001/29/EC, OJ L 167, 22/06/2001 (InfoSoc 
Directive), Art 3; This gives authors or right holders the 
exclusive right to communication of their works to the 
public including making it available “in such a way that 
members of the public may access them from a place and at 
a time individually chosen by them.”
6 Anton Vedder, ‘Accountability of Internet Access and 
Service Providers – Strict Liability Entering Ethics?’ (2001) 
3 Ethics and Information Technology 67, 69–70.
of, intermediaries were the only “tangible” actors 
relatively easy to locate. On the other hand, those 
voices arguing for a lighter approach towards 
internet and intermediary regulation were also 
using economic and moral arguments and technical 
challenges of policing the internet as justification for 
a light-touch approach.7
5 Over 20 years later the debate is essentially led from 
the same angle, but has predictably, increased in 
complexity as the internet makes massive strides 
in transforming the offline world and does indeed 
challenge some substantive legal concepts (e.g. 
copyright). There is still the view which cautions 
against moving away from the current horizontal 
approach in regulating intermediaries or online 
platforms, pointing towards largely consistent 
judgements by the CJEU as proof for the adequacy 
of the current regime.8 However, voices calling 
for a more robust regulatory approach - including 
mandating of a more proactive role of intermediaries 
or online platforms - in combating infringing content 
have become more frequent.9 The assumptions, 
which underpinned the original liability regime, 
have changed. First, the industry itself has come 
of age and is economically more viable. Secondly, 
intermediaries now engage in activities beyond pure 
data hosting. They directly benefit from hosting by 
gaining revenue through advertising add-on services 
such as display optimization or using traffic data. 
This puts a new perspective on the technical and 
automatic character of their activities. Finally, 
filtering technology has advanced in a way that 
makes effective monitoring for infringing content 
more feasible.10 These considerations can also be 
7 Graham Pearce and Nicholas Platten, ‘Promoting the 
Information Society: The EU Directive on Electronic 
Commerce’ (2000) 6 European Law Journal 363, pp. 370-376, 
Lilian Edwards, ‘The Fall and Rise Of Intermediary Liability 
Online’, Law and the Internet (3rd ed, Hart Pub 2009) 84–87.
8 See for example Eleonora Rosati, Why a Reform of Hosting 
Providers’ Safe Harbour Is Unnecessary under EU Copyright 
Law (Zenodo 2016)., and Giancarlo Frosio F, ‘Reforming 
Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European 
Digital Single Market Strategy’ [2017] Northwestern 
University Law Review Online.
9 See the more holistic argumentations of Frank Pasquale, 
‘Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of Expression in 
Spheres of Private Power’ (2016) 17 Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law 487., Robin Mansell, ‘The Public’s Interest in 
Intermediaries’ (2015) 17 info 8., and specifically related 
to infringing content Peggy Valcke, Aleksandra Kuczerawy 
and Pieter-Jan Ombelet, ‘Did the Romans Get It Right? 
What Delfi, Google, EBay, and UPC TeleKabel Wien Have 
in Common’ <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2839213> accessed 2 March 2017. Or 
Mariarosaria Taddeo and Luciano Floridi, ‘The Debate on 
the Moral Responsibilities of Online Service Providers’ 
(2016) 22 Science and Engineering Ethics 1575.
10 D Friedmann, ‘Sinking the Safe Harbour with the Legal 
Certainty of Strict Liability in Sight’ (2014) 9 Journal of 
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traced through CJEU case law, which sought to 
adapt to the evolving business models and technical 
activities of hosting providers when looking at the 
liability exemption for information service providers. 
11 Additionally, service providers, as economically 
viable and powerful gatekeepers of access to the 
internet, are increasingly charged with a moral 
obligation to act responsibly and apply duties of care 
on the lines of corporate social responsibility.12 As 
the intermediary landscape diversifies, those ethical 
norms may call for different kinds of sectoral duties 
of care depending on the area of infringement.13 
The problem with these increased responsibilities 
is that private actors will be required to judge on the 
legality of a huge variety of content. This problem 
may negatively affect freedom of expression and 
information.
6 However, it seems that the EU Commission sits on 
the fence. In response to the results of the “Public 
Consultation on the Regulatory Environment 
for Platforms” launched in 2015, the Commission 
announced last year that it decided to leave the 
current intermediary liability regime of the ECD as it 
is for now “while implementing a sectoral, problem-
driven approach to regulation”.14 It still would 
review, however, in parallel the need for guidance 
on voluntary, good faith measures and Notice-and-
Takedown (NTD) frameworks for online platforms.15 
The consultation had found that 50% of respondents 
saw the current ECD liability regime as not fit for 
purpose, citing dissatisfaction with national case 
law.16 Moreover, the majority of respondents 
demanded that further categories of intermediary 
services be defined, as well as a more differentiated 
policy approach towards the type of illegal or 
Intellectual Property Law & Practice 148, pp. 152–153.
11 See the consideration of the CJEU in Google France, 
Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier, C-236/08 CJEU [2010] 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:159 (CJEU). L’Oréal v eBay (n 2)., through to 
the recent ruling in GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands 
BV, Playboy Enterprises International Inc, Britt Geertruida Dekker, 
C-160/15, [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:644 (CJEU)., Delfi AS v Estonia, 
no 65469/09 (ECtHR (Grand Chamber)).
12 Taddeo and Floridi (n 9).
13 Valcke, Kuczerawy and Ombelet (n 9). who analyze the 
duty of care considerations in the recent CJEU and ECtHRs 
judgements in this area.
14 EU Commission, ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single 
Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe COM(2016) 
288 Final’ p. 9.
15 Ibid.
16 EU Commission, ‘Synopsis Report on the Public Consultation 
on the Regulatory Environment For Platforms, Online 
Intermediaries and the Collaborative Economy’ <https://
ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/results-
public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms-
online-intermediaries-data-and> accessed 29 March 2017. 
p. 15.
infringing content.17 In addition, most intermediaries 
maintain that the national application of the concept 
of the E-Commerce Directive of a “mere technical, 
automatic and passive nature”18 of transmission of 
information by intermediaries needs to be clarified. 
The legal uncertainty surrounding the concept is 
inhibiting investment.
7 This paper will map out some recent sectoral (i.e. 
vertical) developments with regards to content 
hosted by online platforms or ISPs. In the second 
section, following the introduction, it will review a 
series of legislative proposals by the EU Commission 
affecting ISPs and look also at policy developments 
in the area of trademarks, where no equivalent 
proposals have been made so far. First, changes 
to the law that were recently proposed by the 
European Commission in the area of copyright will 
be reviewed. Second, sectoral regulatory trends with 
regard to child protection, hate speech, and fake 
news will be assessed; in particular, the recent draft 
proposal of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(AVMSD)19 concerning video sharing platforms 
(VSPs). In addition, efforts to combat this kind of 
content on other types of platforms will be assessed. 
For these proposals, the impact on the liability 
exemption provisions in Articles 14 and 15 of the ECD 
will be assessed. The review will also include a short 
excursion into recent national attempts to regulate 
hate speech and fake news, notably in Germany. The 
paper will then look at the sectoral challenges with 
regards to trademark infringements; namely, the 
sale of counterfeit products on e-commerce sites, 
where so far no regulatory reform proposals have 
been made. Section III will then present other more 
“grassroots” sectoral developments, which have 
notably taken place in the area of product regulation 
affecting e-commerce. It will first review national 
and EU efforts to combat the online sale of fake 
medicines; secondly, regulatory and enforcement 
trends in online food retail; thirdly, non-compliant 
electronic products; and lastly look at anti-money 
laundering due diligence measures employed in the 
financial sector. The aim of this broader than usual 
review is twofold. First, the paper will investigate 
the impact of these developments on the ECD 
Articles 14 and 15, specifically the increasingly 
difficult distinction between specific infringement 
prevention (Article 14) and the preclusion of a 
general obligation to monitor (Article 15). Secondly, 
it will review the impact of these developments on 
17 Ibid. p.16.
18 Ibid. pp. 15-16, and as stated in Recital 42 of ECD, 2000/31.
19 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2010/13/EU 
on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the provision of audiovisual media services in 
view of changing market realities, COM(2016) 287 final 2016.
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efforts to define reasonable duties of care which 
intermediaries may be required to apply in order to 
detect and prevent infringements.20 It is submitted 
that developments in online market surveillance in 
the area of product regulation, with its strong focus 
on standardization and industry co-regulation, 
could serve as a useful example for developing 
standardized duties of care. Accordingly, a focus will 
be on EU and national efforts to promote industry 
self- and co-regulation.21 This idea will be taken up 
with a view to understand how far standardization 
across sectoral areas can help to bring about more 
codified, sectoral duties of care as a core element of 
a new regulatory approach towards intermediaries.
8 It should be mentioned that the sectoral outline 
offered here has its limitations. Given the restrictions 
of space, depth of coverage has succumbed to breadth. 
The review concentrates on the recent regulatory 
proposals and their impact on intermediary liability 
in the strictest sense. Therefore, a more thorough 
analysis with regards to substantive law (e.g. the 
right of communication to the public in the latest 
copyright directive proposal) and its impact on 
online platforms, or a more detailed review of 
applicable case law, has not been undertaken. 
Consequently, this paper will also not analyse the 
current regulatory framework, for example, in the 
area of copyright or audiovisual media services 
in deeper detail. It will concentrate on recent EU 
policy proposals and other sector developments in 
the area of ISP liability and offer a forward looking 
proposition to incorporate experience from the area 
of product regulation to define standardized duty of 
care regimes for ISPs.
B. Sectoral Review
I. Copyright
9 The EU Commission announced that as part of its 
sectoral, problem driven review of intermediary 
liability, it would first focus on copyright.22 This 
is not surprising. Intellectual property rights and 
copyright specifically, were the legal subject areas 
most rapidly and substantially affected by the 
arrival of the internet and online intermediaries. 
The digitization of cultural goods, such as music, 
literature and films, in connection with the 
ubiquitous nature of the internet, meant that 
copyrighted material can be multiplied, accessed and 
20 Ibid. Recital 48.
21 Hegarty and Cameron (n 1). p. 7.
22 EU Commission, ‘COM(2016) 288 Final’ (n 14).
distributed widely, instantaneously and without loss 
in quality. Hence the early cross references between 
the ECD and InfoSoc Directives23 in 2001, and the 
IP Enforcement Directive (IPRED)24 in 2004. Since 
their inception, the ECD’s Articles 12 - 15 have been 
used to a vast extent to determine ISP’s liabilities 
with regards to intellectual property infringements 
online. This is played out in relevant case law, which 
deals overwhelmingly with the communication 
to the public and use of copyright protected 
works, or the illegitimate sale, advertisement, or 
use of trademark protected goods and services. 
Consequently, academic attention is also focussed on 
the interplay between ISPs and the enforcement of 
IP rights. For purely illustrative reasons, a keyword 
search (using Google scholar) returned 1,890 results 
when searching for “e-commerce directive” in 
conjunction with “copyright” and 777 results for 
“trademark”. By contrast, one obtains substantially 
fewer results when coupling “e-commerce directive” 
with “medicines” (127) and “product safety” (88) or 
“food safety” (37).25
10 True to its communication, following the 
consultation on online platforms and the Digital 
Single Market (DSM), the EU Commission published 
its proposals for a new Directive on copyright in 
the Digital Single Market (DSM)26 in 2016. These 
proposals have attracted immediate criticism27: 
1) despite the announcement to the contrary, the 
provisions in Article 13 of the copyright directive 
would alter the current intermediary liability regime 
and impose stricter liability provisions on online 
platforms; 2) the proposals would be in conflict with 
Article 15 of the ECD, which precludes the imposition 
of general monitoring obligations on ISPs. For the 
purposes of this article, the analysis will be limited 
to the proposed Articles 13 of the new copyright 
directive, which relate specifically to Articles 12 – 
15 of the ECD and its relevant Recitals28 concerning 
23 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, OJ L 167 2001. Recital 16.
24 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, OJ L 157 2004. Art. 2.
25 Search conducted on 03/03/2017.
26 Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL on copyright in the Digital Single 
Market, COM(2016) 593 final 2016.
27 See the responses by Frosio (n 8)., European Copyright Society, 
‘General Opinion on the EU Copyright Reform Package’ (24 
January 2017) <https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.
files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ecs-opinion-on-eu-
copyright-reform-def.pdf> accessed 3 March 2017., Sophie 
Stalla-Bourdillon and others, ‘An Academic Perspective on 
the Copyright Reform’ (2017) 33 Computer Law & Security 
Review 3. 
28 The relevant ECD Recitals are: 42, 45 – 49. Recital 42 ties the 
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intermediary liabilities.29
11 Draft Article 13 is contentious because it appears 
to have given consideration to industry pressure to 
use copyright as means to modify the safe harbour 
provisions through the backdoor.30 Recital 38 states 
that “where information society providers store and 
provide access to the public to copyright protected 
works… and performing an act of communication 
to the public, they are obliged to conclude licensing 
agreements with rights holders”31 unless they are 
covered by the liability exemptions of Art. 14 ECD. 
The text becomes more contentious when looking 
at the qualifying comments with regards to the 
role of the ISP. Recital 38 has an almost identical 
rendition of the judgement in L’Oréal v eBay,32 when 
it says that the ISP’s may acquire an active role by 
“optimising the presentation of the uploaded works 
or subject-matter or promoting them”.33 By contrast, 
the Commission’s add-on in the same sentence, that 
the means by which that optimisation is achieved 
shall be not taken into account, contradicts what 
had been said by the CJEU in that same judgement. 
At the time, the CJEU actually referred the matter 
back to the national court for an examination of 
the concrete circumstances to decide whether eBay 
had played such an active role.34 Unfortunately, 
the application by the UK High Court to which the 
case was referred back never occurred as the two 
parties settled in 2014.35 However, it seems that the 
Commission’s wording would now pre-empt any 
such assessment. The risk is that this potentially 
disqualifies ISPs providing structured and optimised 
content presentation for their content uploaders 
from the availability of the liability exemption in 
availability of the liability exemptions to the “mere technical, 
automatic and passive nature” of the ISPs activity. Recitals 
45 – 49 concern the preventive infringement measures 
member states can impose on ISPs, while precluding the 
obligations of general monitoring. They also mention the 
possibility to require service providers to duties of care for 
detecting and preventing infringements and to develop 
voluntary codes of conduct. 
29 As mentioned above a review of changes in substantial 
copyright despite of the effect on the scope of copyright 
protection and extended potential liabilities shall not be 
undertaken here. The focus of this article is on infringement 
prevention and duties of care.
30 Augustin Reyna, ‘A Tale of Two Industries: The “Value Gap” 
Dilemma in Music Distribution’ <https://policyreview.info/
articles/news/tale-two-industries-value-gap-dilemma-
music-distribution/421> accessed 3 June 2017.
31 See Copyright Directive Proposal (n 26)., Recital 38.
32 L’Oréal v eBay (n 2). Para [116].
33 Ibid.
34 L’Oréal v eBay (n 2). Para [117].
35 Alex Lawson, ‘L’Oreal, eBay Strike Pact To End Counterfeit 
Goods Scuffle’ Law360 (15 January 2014) <https://www.
law360.com/articles/501675/l-oreal-ebay-strike-pact-to-
end-counterfeit-goods-scuffle> accessed 7 March 2017.
Art. 14. While it is true that recent case law may 
have failed to sufficiently assess the role played by 
ISPs in the way they structure their content and in 
particular combine it with advertisements,36 the 
blanket qualification offered by Recital 38 seems 
oversimplified. Despite its original announcement, 
this would actually alter the current liability regime 
afforded in the ECD and significantly narrow the 
availability of the hosting provider defence.
12 Draft Article 13 also focuses on the mandating of 
filtering technologies for the enforcement of the 
licensing agreements prescribed between rights 
holders and ISPs. It remains to be seen whether 
this article de facto invalidates Article 15 ECD,37 
or whether it is “just” a very broad but specific 
obligation to prevent infringements (Article 14(3) 
ECD). CJEU case law has in the past been clear in 
allowing at a maximum the prevention of already 
notified infringements and rejecting any further 
general filtering of content uploaded to a hosting 
provider’s site.38 This has created a true conundrum 
which exemplifies the problem with the ECD. It was 
drafted in the last millennium when ISPs and the 
internet industry were of a different breed and 
filtering technology was far from what it is today. The 
changed nature of today’s online platforms has been 
alluded to above. However, with filtering technology 
becoming more sophisticated, the actual “tipping 
point of omniscience”39 for those intermediaries who 
employ it, is but a matter of time if it has not already 
been reached. National courts, meanwhile, had to 
be more pragmatic than the CJEU and the current 
Commission proposal and adapt to this reality as can 
be seen in rulings in Germany where courts have 
engaged in a very detailed evaluation over the kind 
of duty of care and prevention measures a video 
platform can be asked to engage in.40 It is therefore 
disappointing that the proposed Article 13 does not 
take account of these efforts but instead aggravates 
this unclear situation by further blurring the line 
between mandatory filtering and the rejection of any 
general obligation to monitor. It clearly backfires 
36 Matthias Leistner, ‘Copyright Law on the Internet in Need 
of Reform: Hyperlinks, Online Platforms and Aggregators’ 
[2017] Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 
jpw190, 7. With a specific reference to recent German case.
37 Which precludes member states from obliging ISPs to 
monitor information stored and transmitted on a general 
basis.
38 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers 
CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV, C-360/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85 
(CJEU 2012).at [101].
39 Friedmann (n 10). p. 150.
40 Haftung der Internetvideoplattform Youtube für rechtswidrige 
Uploads, 5 U 87/12 (Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht 
Hamburg 5 Zivilsenat). Paras, [363, 364, 370, 477, 481] and 
a detailed consideration of the Content ID software paras 
[482-485].
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on the legislator that it did not encourage more 
explicitly, at an early stage, the development of 
“good Samaritan” efforts to proactively identify 
and remove infringing content.41 As it stands, the 
distinction between specific and general monitoring 
is becoming obsolete in practice.
13 By contrast, the Commission now insists on bringing 
ISPs and rights holders together to ensure an 
effective enforcement of the licensing agreements 
(Draft Article 13). However, the information flow is 
remarkably one-directional in that ISPs are tasked 
with providing most of the data on their activities. 
On the other hand, the detail of the new complaints 
and redress mechanisms remain patchy. Draft 
Recital 38 is even more intrusive in that it asks ISPs 
to share information at an excessive level. For many 
ISPs their filtering technology is proprietary, and 
may even be part of more holistic and sensitive fraud 
detection and investigation activities. It should not 
be shared with any external third parties, unless 
explicitly requested by courts and law enforcement 
authorities. In addition, expecting ISPs to share 
information on “the type of technologies used, 
the way they are operated and their success rate 
for the recognition of right holders’ content” with 
rights holders, who may be also in contact with 
competing platforms and other third parties, goes 
very far. This formulation seems to be informed by 
rights holder interests and reflects frustration over 
not getting sufficient information on, for example, 
repeat infringers or the speed and extent to which 
intermediaries investigate.
14 Moreover, the Commission’s insistence on what 
appear to be private cooperation agreements between 
ISPs and rights holders can also be seen critically. 
Making ISPs, who are privately and commercially 
motivated actors with decisive power over access to 
speech and information into copyright enforcement 
agents for the entertainment industry,42 would be 
a step backward in the quest for an “open, user-
centric, interoperable platform ecosystem”, which 
the internet is supposed to become in Europe.43 
 
 
 
 
 
41 Leistner (n 36) p. 6.
42 Enrico Bonadio, ‘File Sharing, Copyright and Freedom of 
Speech’ (2011) 33 E. I. P. R 619, 628.
43 EU Commission, ‘COM(2016) 288 Final’ (n 14) p. 4.
II. Protection of minors, hate 
speech and fake news
15 The challenges of vertical legislation in the complex 
ecosystem in which today’s platforms operate 
become apparent when looking at the latest proposal 
to amend the redraft of the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive (AVMSD).44 The Commission 
published a proposal to amend Directive 2010/13/EU 
concerning Provision of Audiovisual Media Services 
(AMSD) in May 2016 as part of its outcome from the 
public consultation on online platforms.45 While 
the above proposal on copyright clearly targets all 
kinds of ISPs, the intermediary liability provisions of 
Article 28a in the recently proposed re-draft of the 
AVMSD looks at the protection of minors and at hate 
speech on video-sharing platforms (VSPs). However, 
concerns over hate speech and access to material 
unsuitable for/or abusive towards children are not 
just an issue concerning video-sharing platforms, 
but also sites hosting news, blogs, pictures and 
social media in general. With a consistent sectoral 
approach the Commission could have targeted this 
kind of content (be it speech, static, moving images, 
or sound) across all platforms. For example, the EU 
Commission recently agreed on a (non-binding) 
code of conduct with major social media platform 
operators to combat hate speech and terrorist 
content.46 The press release contains a reference 
to the NTD mechanism, which resulted from the 
ECD. In the code of conduct the participating 
platforms commit, amongst others, to processes for 
effective notification, review, and removal of hate 
speech and incitement to violent content (within 
24 hours) as well as information sharing on the 
NTD procedures. The corresponding measures in 
the AVMSD re-draft (Article 28a) applying to VSPs, 
are by far more detailed and prescriptive. First, the 
protection afforded through Article 14 ECD for VSPs 
is not clear. The Commission refers to the Article 14 
(ECD) liability exemptions47 but specifies that where 
the VSPs have control over the organisation of the 
content, protective measures should apply to the 
organisation of that content and not to the content 
44 ‘Proposal for a directive of the European parliament and 
of the Council Amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the 
Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid down by Law, 
Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States 
Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media Services in 
View of Changing Market Realities, COM(2016) 287 Final’ 
(2016).
45 Proposed AVMSD amendment (n 19).
46 ‘European Commission and IT Companies Announce Code 
of Conduct on Illegal Online Hate Speech’ <http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1937_en.htm> accessed 9 
March 2017. and ‘Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal 
Hate Speech Online’ (2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
fundamental-rights/files/hate_speech_code_of_conduct_
en.pdf> accessed 9 March 2017.
47 Proposed AVMSD amendment (n 19).
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as such. This is ambiguous. In order to organize 
the content in the way specified in Article 28a (by 
applying age verification, parental control) the 
nature of the content would necessarily have to be 
monitored in some way, unless the platforms rely 
fully on the user to flag and categorize restricted 
content. It can be argued however, that in order 
to offer efficient protection, VSPs would need to 
accompany user-driven categorization by some 
due diligence measures, e.g. audits, spot checks. 
That in itself would involve - if done properly and 
effectively - analysing, i.e. filtering and screening 
content. As mentioned above, the proposal appears 
to not fully take into account the realities of what 
platforms may be able to do already as part of their 
risk management activities. In addition, as in the 
copyright directive proposal this is very close, if not 
congruent, with a general obligation to monitor, 
which is precluded by Article 15 (ECD). Thus, would 
this mean that only those VSPs which do not organize 
the content at all would be exempt from any of the 
measures listed in Article 28a? The complementation 
of the ECD, announced in the draft proposal48 would 
actually amount to a de facto modification of Article 
14 for VSPs. This is even more complicated when 
considering that, while prescribing maximum 
protection measures for content that is harmful for 
minors and for content inciting to violence, Member 
States may impose stricter measures to combat 
illegal content if they comply with Articles 14 and 
15 ECD. 49 It is also not clear how any protection 
measures beyond the maximum set by the proposed 
directive and in the context of available technology 
would not result in general monitoring precluded by 
Article 15 ECD. If anything, these measures introduce 
more ambiguity and potentially more inequality 
compared to picture and news/text based platforms 
and systems. The Commission uses the European 
Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services 
(ERGA) (Article 30a) to facilitate co-regulation 
through establishing codes of conduct (Article 4(7)). 
The development of codes of conduct and standards 
drawn up under a co-regulatory approach could 
be seen as a step towards developing technology-
based diligence processes. However, in view of the 
strict measures proposed in Article 28a, ISPs may be 
hesitant to volunteer any information about their 
true technical capabilities. Moreover, a truly sectoral 
approach would have looked at code of conduct for 
hate speech and child protection across the entire 
spectrum of intermediaries. It is understood that the 
Commission may only have had the AVMSD and its 
extension of scope to VSPs at hand as a legislative 
48 Ibid 5.p.3.
49 Proposed AVMSD amendment (n 19). Recital 30, and Article 
28a (5). The measures mentioned in Art 28a are maximum 
measures only with regards to content harmful for minors 
and content inciting to violence and hatred. Stricter 
measures may apply for illegal content, but they must 
comply with Articles 14 and 15 ECD.
tool to quickly propose regulation in this area. 
However as it stands, a company like Facebook may 
now face different obligations and liability risks 
depending on whether hate speech is posted by 
video, or as a written article.
16 The current debate surrounding “fake news” on 
social media platforms not only illustrates the 
politicised environment in which today’s platforms 
operate but also how their influence and impact on 
information and news is perceived in society. While 
the actual effect of fake news in shaping political 
views and voting behaviour has not yet been proven, 
it still highlights the importance of social media as 
an information source.50 In fact, fake news may be 
much more motivated by underlying economics, 
enabled by a shift in advertising business models 
on the internet, than targeted misinformation.51 The 
phenomenon attracted the attention of legislators 
in EU Member States and the Commission.52 
The German Government even proposed a draft 
“network enforcement” law to oblige social media 
platforms to delete “hate crime“ content which is 
“obviously infringing” within 24 hours following 
notification.53 Non-obvious infringing content 
must be decided on within 7 days. The draft defines 
50 Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, ‘Social Media and Fake 
News in the 2016 Election’ (National Bureau of Economic 
Research 2017) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w23089> 
accessed 10 March 2017. They argue that fake news are 
mainly part of a long history of conspiracy theory based 
information and that the actual impact on voting outcomes 
in the 2016 US Federal Elections is irrelevant. and: Emma 
Goodman, ‘How Has Media Policy Responded to Fake News?’ 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2017/02/07/
how-has-media-policy-responded-to-fake-news/> accessed 
30 March 2017.
51 Damian Tambini, ‘How Advertising Fuels Fake News’ 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2017/02/24/
how-advertising-fuels-fake-news/> accessed 30 March 
2017. Demonstrates how the change in advertising models 
on the internet which enables publishers worldwide, with 
no or little adherence to professional ethical principles or 
journalistic standards, to use platforms to publish news and 
to benefit financially from its spread. In addition, platforms 
profit financially too from attracting traffic to their sites.
52 The UK Parliament opened an inquiry into “Fake 
News” in early 2017: UK Parliament, Culture, Media and 
Sport Committee, ‘“Fake News” Inquiry Launched’ (30 
January 2017) <http://www.parliament.uk/business/
committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/culture-
media-and-sport-committee/news-parliament-2015/
fake-news-launch-16-17/> accessed 30 March 2017., and 
the EU Commission also reacted to the phenomenon with 
heightened attention: EU Observer, ‘EU Raises Alarm 
on Fake News and Hacking’ (11 January 2017) <https://
euobserver.com/foreign/136503> accessed 30 March 2017.
53 Bundesministeriums der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, 
‘Entwurf Eines Gesetzes Zur Verbesserung Der 
Rechtsdurchsetzung in Sozialen Netzwerken’ <https://
netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2017/03/1703014_
NetzwerkDurchsetzungsG.pdf> accessed 15 March 2017. p. 
7.
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“hate crime” as libel, defamation, and incitement to 
hatred, but also includes “punishable fake news”.54 
It will be interesting to see how platforms will make 
the call on “obviously infringing” fake news if the 
draft enters into force. The law would apply to all 
social networks (defined by the law) which fall under 
the definition of service providers as defined per 
ECD Article 2(b). The draft makes due reference to 
Article 14 ECD, as well as Recitals 46 and 48 ECD about 
the possibility of member states to ask providers to 
prevent repeat infringements and to mandate that 
the providers apply reasonable duties of care.55 
Following suit, the draft also mentions that this must 
not constitute general monitoring duties precluded 
under Article 15. Indeed, the draft law does not 
appear to mandate any measures that could be seen 
as proactive general monitoring. It appears to fix at 
a national level the code of conduct agreed earlier in 
the year between platforms and the Commission and 
a similar agreement concluded at national level,56 
and prescribes detailed NTD obligations. For the 
notices, it relies on Government and industry based 
complaint mechanisms already in place, as well as 
user complaints. The mandating of regular reporting 
and the creation of a “responsible person” is in line 
with similar compliance requirements across other 
sectors.57
17 It remains to be seen whether the law will pass in this 
form and prior to the federal elections in Germany 
in September 2017. However, these developments 
can be framed into the wider context over media 
pluralism and the power online intermediaries have 
gained as gatekeepers to information. It reflects a 
tendency to discuss more openly the responsibility 
of social media platforms, search engines, and 
platforms in general over the content hosted on 
their sites. In fact, the danger of “cheap, fluff speech” 
on the internet undermining the economic basis of 
quality journalism was noted some time ago.58 First, 
the cost-competition offered by cheaper journalism 
54 Ibid. p.10.
55 Ibid. p.12.
56 Ibid., Apart from the EU initiative, the German Government 
had agreed one year earlier non-binding measures to 
tackle hate speech with Facebook, Google and Twitter, 
amongst others: Bundesministeriums der Justiz und 
für Verbraucherschutz, ‘Together against Hate Speech 
- Ways to Tackle Online Hateful Content Proposed 
by the Task Force against Illegal Online Hate Speech’ 
<http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/
Artikel/12152015_TaskForceErgebnispapier_eng.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=2> accessed 30 March 2017.
57 The concept of “responsible” or “competent” persons and 
statutory reporting can be traced through data protection, 
financial compliance, or occupational health and safety 
regulation.
58 Neil Weinstock Netanel, ‘New Media in Old Bottles? Barron’s 
Contextual First Amendment and Copyright in the Digital 
Age’ (2008) 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev 952, pp.965, 977-980.
(e.g. blogging – be it true or spun news) increases 
economic pressure on expensive, quality and fact-
checking types of journalism, while distribution and 
availability to a mass audience remain the same. 
Secondly, the internet diverts advertising revenue 
away from traditional news media to cheaper online 
content, which in effect represents a redistribution 
of funding from traditional journalists to online news 
creators.59 Search engines and news aggregators 
would inevitably contribute to this trend.60
18 More generally, there is an inherent bias when 
search engines, social media, or news aggregators 
filter, rank and display information and news to 
users. The algorithms governing the display and 
ranking of news and search results are composed 
from both ideological interests to remain relevant 
for users and economic interests to remain 
relevant for advertisers.61 The traditional measure 
of market power may not apply any longer for 
powerful intermediaries operating in multi-sided 
markets with intricate and not yet fully understood 
interdependencies.62 One proposed new regulatory 
approach would consider intermediaries as “digital 
utilities”, reflecting their role as gatekeepers for 
access to speech and information.63 The control 
they exercise over the kind of information (news, 
search results) displayed to users would make them 
content providers with direct liability for defamation 
or copyright infringement.64 A new regulatory 
approach could also involve mandated algorithmic 
accountability, or the ability of regulators to evaluate 
algorithmic models with regards to their impact on 
serving the public interest.65 This discussion shows 
how closely interrelated content and infrastructure 
are in today’s online platform economy. The 
organization and distribution of search results 
and newsfeeds is crucial for the economic success 
of various platforms. However for this to happen, 
algorithms will inevitably have to be able to analyse 
59 C Edwin Baker, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why 
Ownership Matters (Cambridge University Press 2007). In: 
Netanel (n 58).pp.977-980.
60 Annabelle Gawer and others, Online Platforms: Contrasting 
Perceptions of European Stakeholders a Qualitative 
Analysis of the European Commission’s Public Consultation 
on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms: Final Report. 
(Publications Office 2014) <http://bookshop.europa.eu/ur
i?target=EUB:NOTICE:KK0416398:EN:HTML> accessed 13 
March 2017.
61 Paško Bilić, ‘Search Algorithms, Hidden Labour and 
Information Control’ (2016) 3 Big Data & Society 
205395171665215.
62 Damian Tambini and Sharif Labo, ‘Digital Intermediaries in 
the UK: Implications for News Plurality’ (2016) 18 info 33. 
pp.34-35.
63 Pasquale, ‘Platform Neutrality’ pp. 493-494.
64 Ibid.
65 Julie E Cohen, ‘The Regulatory State in the Information Age’ 
(2016) 17 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 369. pp.385, 403-404.
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and recognise the content as well. The wide-reaching 
exemption that exists currently for these “mere 
conduits” or “hosts” who hold such sweeping gate-
keeping powers may not be justifiable any longer. 
The concrete duties which flow from these powers 
and the balance that needs to be respected between 
combating illegal content and user rights66 need to 
be recalibrated by the EU legislator. However, the 
current proposals to tackle hate speech and content 
harmful for minors are fragmented and do not 
cover all content formats consistently. Secondly, by 
advancing the scope of preventive monitoring, the 
AVMSD proposal ignores the fact that the dividing 
line to general monitoring is in the process of 
vanishing. Instead of insisting on the mantra pitting 
Article 14 against Article 15, it is submitted that a 
formulation of morally and technically founded 
duties of care would be more appropriate. Thirdly, 
the AVMSD proposal outsources the decision making 
over content removal to agreements between 
powerful private actors, thus potentially limiting 
media pluralism and tightening the grip of large 
platforms over information provision. The latter is 
also a danger inherent in the code of conduct the 
EU Commission agreed with major social media 
platforms earlier in 2016.
III. Trademarks – the online 
sale of physical goods
19 In the analysis report of the Commission’s Public 
Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for 
Platforms, the sale of counterfeit goods via the 
internet was judged at least as problematic by 
businesses as the availability of copyright infringing 
material on the internet.67 Rights holders in both 
the copyright and trademark intensive industries 
have been similarly strong in their claims of 
damage caused by infringements caused through 
online commerce.68 However, the Commission did 
not initiate any legislative action with regards 
to combating trademark infringements on the 
internet as part of its self-professed problem 
driven approach, announced in the communication 
following the consultation on online platforms. It 
merely announced that it may consider the role 
intermediaries can play in protecting IPRs, notably 
with regards to counterfeit, in its upcoming review 
of the IPRED.69 However, if there is reason to act 
with regards to copyright and impose significant 
changes to the intermediary liability provisions 
through connected legislation, then inactivity 
66 Taddeo and Floridi (n 9) 1585–1586.
67 Gawer and others (n 60). pp.14-16.
68 Ibid.
69 EU Commission, ‘COM(2016) 288 Final’ (n 14) p. 8.
in the area of trademarks could introduce even 
more inconsistency and legal fragmentation. This 
is even more surprising as key CJEU rulings on the 
availability of the liability exemption and reasonable 
duties of care are coming from the area of trademark 
law.70
20 Perhaps the disparity in legislative activity 
between tackling digital copyright infringements 
and trademark violations for goods sold physically 
through the internet is due to the fact that 
infringement detection and prevention in both 
areas require different approaches. First, contrary 
to digitally distributed products, the production 
and delivery of physical goods happens in the 
traditional brick and mortar world. One could argue 
that detection and control of illegal activities in the 
physical supply chain would be more straightforward 
to conduct. Indeed, the disruption of the supply chain, 
from suppressing manufacturing, to seizures during 
shipping and distribution are the most commonly 
sought ways to deal with the phenomenon.71 
Notwithstanding this fact, it is however much 
more difficult to ascertain from an online offering 
- where just a product picture may be available - 
whether it is indeed infringing a trademark. In order 
to ascertain the infringing nature of a product, 
detailed brand and product knowledge are needed. 
This would need to be combined with fact-finding 
through product inspection, involving specialised 
staff, and often in close co-operation with the rights-
owner. This poses an additional challenge for online 
marketplaces, which list thousands or even millions 
products from a plethora of sellers potentially based 
worldwide.72 The difficulties in coming to a more 
decisive assessment of which reasonable duties of 
care can be expected from ISPs in order to prevent 
70 Google France v Louis Vuitton (n 11)., and L’Oréal v eBay (n 2).
71 See Roudaut, Mickaël R., ‘From Sweathsops to Organized 
Crime’, Criminal enforcement of intellectual property: a 
handbook of contemporary research (Edward Elgar 2012). 
for a more detailed description of the supply chain and the 
breadth of counterfeiting.
72 For example as of 2014 over 2 active million 3rd part sellers 
were registered on the Amazon platform (‘Amazon’s Third-
Party Sellers Ship Record-Breaking 2 Billion Items In 2014, 
But Merchant Numbers Stay Flat’, Techcrunch.com, 5 January 
2015, <https://techcrunch.com/2015/01/05/amazon-third-
party-sellers-2014/>) shipping over 2 bn units during that 
year. In December 2017, Amazon listed 330 million physical 
product offers on its worldwide marketplaces. With 8% 
unit growth during that month an estimated 880K new 
products would have been uploaded on average every day 
worldwide, with the large majority coming from 3rd part 
sellers (‘How Many Products Are Sold on Amazon.Com 
– January 2017 Report’ [2017] scrapehero.com <https://
www.scrapehero.com/how-many-products-are-sold-
on-amazon-com-january-2017-report/>). The content 
recognition technologies for checking physical goods sold 
online are less sophisticated than those available to digital 
products.
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infringement, including repeat offences, have been 
considered in EU and national case law.73 In L’Oréal 
v eBay the CJEU found that although eBay could not 
be asked to monitor its entire traffic, according to 
Article 15 ECD and the balancing exercise required 
by Article 3 of the IPRED, it should act as a diligent 
economic operator.. It needed to identify the 
infringing party and prevent further infringements 
of the same kind.74 However, that guidance is 
broad, and technically the dividing line between 
this requirement and general monitoring is, once 
more, blurred. German courts had in the past been 
more inclusive towards the intermediary with 
regards to the duty of care that should be expected 
of them. In Internetversteigerung75 intermediary 
eBay had a duty to prevent any “clearly noticeable” 
trademark infringements relating to the Rolex 
products in general on its site. “Clearly noticeable” 
in that context relates to offers that have similar 
characteristics to the already notified infringements 
(same brand name and image, including different 
model numbers).76 Note the similar wording in the 
German draft law against hate speech asking social 
media platforms to take down “obviously infringing” 
content within 24 hours.77 In Kinderhochstühle78 
II the Federal Supreme Court (BGH) imposed 
extended duties of care on eBay with regards to 
offers which it had enhanced by advertisement 
links from search engines.79 Reviewing product 
images and specifications provided by the seller 
will often remain the only tangible way of assessing 
the likelihood of infringement for the intermediary 
when confronted with a notice of takedown.
21 Secondly, the duties of care that can be expected 
of intermediaries will also depend on the specific 
business model and would need to be decided on a 
case-by-case basis by courts. A detailed consideration 
of this issue was done in YouTube v Gema.80 This 
changes somewhat the approach of courts towards 
duties of care compared to the sales of digital goods. 
For the latter, the reliance and indeed proposed 
73 Google France v Louis Vuitton (n 11). L’Oréal v eBay (n 2). Maceo 
v eBay International AG, (Tribunal de grande instance de 
Paris, 3ème chambre, 1ère section).
74 L’Oréal v eBay (n 2).at [120]-[122], [139]-[142], [144].
75 Internetversteigerung III (Rolex v Ricardo.de), Az I ZR 73/05 [2008] 
MIR06/2008 (BGH).
76 Ibid. at [51] – [55].
77 Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz 
(n 53).
78 Copyright Directive Proposal (n 26). Article 13, Recital 39.
79 Kinderhochstühle im Internet II, I ZR 216/11 [2013] MIR 2013 Dok 
077 (BGH).
80 Haftung der Internetvideoplattform Youtube für rechtswidrige 
Uploads, 5 U 87/12 (n 40). Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht 
Hamburg 5. Zivilsenat, At [370].
mandating of content recognition technologies,81 
seems to be more technically established than 
technology to identify trademark infringing use in 
e-commerce on online marketplaces.
22 Thirdly, the complexity of trademark law has only 
increased with the availability of goods online. 
While the CJEU has repeatedly absolved online 
platforms from primary liability for trademark 
infringement, the scope of protection afforded to 
trademark owners has extended beyond the function 
of indicating the origin of a product.82 Counterfeit 
is arguably the most clearly infringing issue as in 
this instance a person affixes a sign identical to that 
of a registered trademark to goods for which the 
trademark has been registered.83 In these double 
identity cases, the intention of the infringer is 
usually to straightforwardly imitate a trademark 
and the goods related to it. However, the CJEU has 
expanded the protection afforded by trademark 
owners to uses which are much more difficult to 
decide by platforms if faced with rights holder 
notifications. In Bellure84 and in Interflora85 the CJEU 
ruled that the unfair advantage taken by the use of 
a sign similar to a registered mark with a reputation 
does not need to be restricted to cases where there 
is a likelihood of confusion or a detriment to the 
reputation of the earlier mark.86 Although the rulings 
related to comparative advertising and the use of 
Adwords in search engines, there are many sellers 
on today’s marketplace platforms who may fall into 
the scope of these rulings. For example, a seller 
might offer stationery, clothing or other accessory 
products relating to what courts may identify as 
reputable car brands, thus riding on the attractive 
power of the car brand to boost its sales. Again, a 
correct judgement call by the marketplace when 
approached by brands with notices of infringement 
is far from evident. Another issue concerns the sale 
of goods not destined for the EU market – also called 
grey goods.87 In today’s global marketplace sellers 
81 Copyright Directive Proposal (n 31).
82 Ilanah Simon Fhima, ‘Trademark Law and Advertising 
Keywords’, Research Handbook on EU Internet Law (Edward 
Elgar 2014). pp.146-151.
83 See the definition in the Agreement On Trade-Related 
Aspects Of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 1994. (TRIPS 
Agreement), Article 51, Footnote 14.
84 L’Oréal SA, Lancôme parfums et beauté & Cie SNC, Laboratoire 
Garnier & Cie v Bellure NV, Malaika Investments Ltd, trading as 
‘Honey pot cosmetic & Perfumery Sales’, Starion International Ltd, 
C-487/07 [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:378 (CJEU).
85 Interflora Inc, Interflora British Unit v Marks & Spencer plc, 
Flowers Direct Online Ltd, C-323/09 [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:604 
(CJEU).
86 Bellure (n 84). At [50], [58] and Interflora (n 85). At [60] – [95].
87 Robert W Payne, ‘Unauthorized Online Dealers of “Genuine” 
Products in the Amazon Marketplace and beyond: Remedies 
for Brand Owners’ [2014] J Internet Law 3.
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can list and sell products across the globe and ship 
to users worldwide. Customs can only scratch the 
surface in checking and detecting shipments with 
such products. Furthermore, generic replacement 
consumables for OEM products, such as printer 
cartridges, water filters or even bin liners may pose 
an issue depending on how they are advertised on 
the site. These are some of the borderline cases 
happening on e-commerce platforms. Not all of these 
cases do necessarily restrict the trademark right of 
a brand owner. By contrast, they may be subject to 
abuse by brand owners and their agents themselves 
by providing abusive notices. Large platforms have 
responded mainly by entering the kind of private 
agreements with rights holders which in the long 
run could stifle competition. For example, Amazon 
has started to “gate” certain brands on their site, 
restricting the sale of the brand either to the brand 
owner themselves or to a pre-authorised selection of 
distributors.88 Meanwhile eBay operates takedowns 
for participants in its VERO programme, which gives 
brand owners the opportunity to identify allegedly 
infringing offers and notify them to the company.89
23 In 2011 the EU Commission initiated a Memorandum 
of Understanding between rights holders and 
marketplace platforms to foster cooperation and 
the development measures to prevent infringements 
and act against repeat infringers.90 However, the 2013 
progress report of the Commission did not show any 
notable progress and indeed hinted at difficulties in 
making stakeholders agree on a common approach.91 
The renewed MoU92 of 2016 has remained unchanged 
in wording with the sole difference that stakeholders 
have agreed to some high level key performance 
indicators (KPIs) measuring the efficiency of the MoU. 
It should be noted that it took stakeholders 5 years 
88 Ari Levy, ‘Amazon’s Plan to Fight Counterfeiters Will 
Cost Legit Sellers a Ton’ CNBC (29 August 2016) <http://
www.cnbc.com/2016/08/29/amazons-plan-to-fight-
counterfeiters-will-cost-legit-sellers-a-ton.html> accessed 
16 March 2017.
89 Lilian Edwards, ‘The Role of Internet Intermediaries in 
Advancing Public Policy Objectives Forging Partnerships for 
Advancing Policy Objectives for the Internet Economy, Part 
II’ <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1875708> accessed 30 March 2017. p. 70.
90 ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit 
Goods over the Internet, 2011’.
91 EU Commission, ‘REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the 
Functioning of the Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Sale of Counterfeit Goods via the Internet /COM/2013/0209 
Final’ COM/2013/0209 final <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0209> accessed 
17 March 2017. See Articles 3.1 and 3.8 in particular.
92 ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Online Sale of 
Counterfeit Goods, 2016’ <http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/
documents/18023/attachments/1/translations/> accessed 
17 March 2017.
to agree on a few basic metrics: showing the number 
of offers in selected product categories which lead to 
alleged counterfeit products; the number of listings 
removed following proactive platform measures 
and rights-owner notifications; and the number 
of restrictions imposed on sellers. It is submitted 
that the current unsatisfactory situation will lead 
to further gating style private agreements between 
platforms and rights holders which may further 
restrict competition and drive out smaller sellers 
with competitive and innovative offers. It appears 
the sector is far away from the development of any 
reasonable duty of care principles and also from the 
Commission making any legislative proposals.
C. An alternative approach towards 
standardized duties of care?
24 As mentioned earlier the fight against illegal, unsafe 
or other non-conforming products in e-commerce 
has received relatively little attention within the 
academic literature. In the following section, the 
paper presents efforts with regards to combating the 
online sale of infringing medicines, food, consumer 
electronics, as well as anti-money laundering due 
diligence. The idea is to present approaches adopted 
by market surveillance authorities and the industry 
and explore whether they could serve as an example 
for developing intermediary duties of care.
I. Fake medicines
25 The problem of substandard, spurious, falsely 
labelled, falsified and counterfeit (SSFFC) medical 
products has been recognised worldwide as 
an important public health risk which is only 
exacerbated by the internet.93 While in industrialized 
countries these products have rarely contaminated 
official supply chains, the increased importance 
of recreational drugs and other non-prescriptive 
medication has been capitalised on by online sellers 
posing as pharmacies in the Western world.94 In 
2011, the EU took concrete policy action in view 
of this problem and passed legislation to prevent 
SSFFCs entering the supply chain.95 Under a new 
93 World Health Organisation, ‘Medicines: Spurious/Falsely-
Labelled/ Falsified/Counterfeit (SFFC) Medicines, Fact Sheet 
N°275’, January 2016, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
factsheets/fs275/en/.
94 Hans-Georg Koch, ‘Strategies against Counterfeiting 
of Drugs: A Comparative Criminal Law Study’, Criminal 
enforcement of intellectual property: a handbook of contemporary 
research (Edward Elgar 2012).
95 Directive 2011/62/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8 June 2011 amending Directive 2001/83/
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Directive, businesses or persons selling medicinal 
products at a distance need to notify and register 
with national authorities. They will then be awarded 
with a certificate identifying them as an approved 
online pharmacy, which they will need to display 
on each offer detail page. The logo links through 
to a public a register, proving the official status of 
the seller.96 The Directive provides a reference to 
the ECD, amongst others, by stating that persons 
not meeting these conditions but selling medicinal 
products at a distance shall be subject to “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive penalties.”97 Moreover 
the Directive fosters standardisation by making the 
approval measures for online pharmacies and the 
logo subject to the procedures laid down in the 
Technical Standards Directive.98 While nothing is 
said in that Directive about the processes for online 
platforms which merely host offers from sellers of 
medicinal products, the measures appear to give 
e-commerce platforms a practical tool for checking 
the compliance of the seller during on-boarding. It 
is suggested that these measures could be part of 
reasonable duties of care, which can be expected 
from ISPs possibly also in other areas. In addition, 
they could facilitate the prevention and detection 
of infringing offers, by for example, creating a gated 
product category exclusively for certified pharmacies. 
Meanwhile, national market surveillance authorities 
such as the UK’s MHRA have devoted resources and 
created specific capabilities to filter the internet 
for illegal offers. They cooperate with platform 
operators and law enforcement to withdraw and 
prevent infringing products.99 It could be argued that 
this co-regulatory cooperation to develop dialogue 
between platforms and authorities and incorporate 
technical standards into the process, are more 
suitable compared to purely self-regulatory models. 
 
 
 
 
 
EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products 
for human use, as regards the prevention of the entry into 
the legal supply chain of falsified medicinal products 2011. 
Recitals 2, 21.
96 Ibid. Article 85c.
97 Ibid. Article 85c (6).
98 Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure 
for the provision of information in the field of technical 
regulations and of rules on Information Society services 
2015. see Art 85 c (1) Directive 2001/83/EC (n 95).
99 Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, UK, 
‘Falsified Medical Products Strategy 2012-2015’ <http://
www.iracm.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MHRA-
FMPS.pdf> accessed 17 March 2017. pp. 26-29.
II. Online food retail
26 Sales of food via the internet have seen a rise in 
popularity. With delivery services becoming faster 
and more suited to consumer demand, online sales of 
food stuffs have seen a marked increase over recent 
years. The food industry and the entire supply chain 
are also subject to strict regulation. In 2011 the EU 
adapted its regulatory framework to the online 
world.100 For one, it introduced a new regulation 
on food information requirements to consumers 
by which food labelling in online shops was aligned 
to the labelling requirements for sales in physical 
shops. This now extends to ingredients lists, allergen 
warnings and certain nutritional information.101 
Secondly, Regulation 852/2004 requires online food 
retailers to register with national authorities.102 
Depending on the nature of the business, they may 
even need to apply for authorisation to operate. The 
surveillance and enforcement of compliance with 
applicable food legislation is to be performed by 
national market surveillance authorities.103 Finally, 
a host of additional provisions apply to the sale 
of food products, such as for example those with 
pharmacologically active ingredients, products 
with non-approved health claims, non-approved 
novel foods,104 and organic products.105 For a large 
e-commerce marketplace that hosts relevant offers, 
the prospect of a safe harbour in this context may 
come as a relief. However, this would not help solve 
the problem. A pilot study conducted in Germany 
in 2014106 searched for food stuffs containing the 
known hazardous food ingredient synephine in 
100 Lomme Van de Veer, ‘Food Online: Radical Changes to the 
Digital Ship Window’ [2014] Eur. Food & Feed L. Rev. 78. pp. 
87-90.
101 Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of 
food information to consumers 2011. Article 14 (1).
102 Peter Kranz, Hannes Harms and Claudia Kuhr, ‘Kontrolle 
der im Internet gehandelten Erzeugnisse des LFGB und 
Tabakerzeugnisse (G@ZIELT)’ (2015) 10 Journal für 
Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit 13. P.14, 
Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of 
foodstuffs 2004.
103 Clemens Comans, ‘Onlinehandel Mit Lebensmitteln 
– Mit Den Projekten „ELKE“ Und „G@zielt“ Auf Dem 
Weg Zu Einer Funktionierenden Überwachung Des 
Onlinehandels’ (2015) 10 Journal für Verbraucherschutz 
und Lebensmittelsicherheit 109. p. 109.
104 For a more detailed description, see: Alexandra Krewinkel 
and others, ‘Concept for Automated Computer-Aided 
Identification and Evaluation of Potentially Non-Compliant 
Food Products Traded via Electronic Commerce’ (2016) 61 
Food Control 204.
105 Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on 
organic production and labelling of organic products and 
repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91. Article 28.
106 See for a detailed description in Krewinkel and others (n 
104). pp.207-209.
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connection with caffeine. Using a search engine 
based filter software it identified 219 relevant 
hazardous products sold across 449 web shops 
across Europe. The chances that these shops also 
sell via large online marketplaces are high. This may 
not look massive but considering the complex list 
of food additives which are regulated in the EU107 
and the international nature of sellers on the big 
marketplaces, the problem is likely to be greater. 
Authorities have long started filtering marketplaces 
on their own initiative. A project in Germany uses 
data from tax authorities to identify whether 
online shops with food offers have registered with 
the authorities. A web crawler operated by tax 
authorities has been modified to search for non-
registered food businesses, as well as “high-risk” or 
borderline food. According to this study, 40% of food 
online retailers had not registered with authorities 
in 2014.108 Authorities took concrete action by 
agreeing with Germany’s major e-commerce trust 
mark certifiers that sellers who failed to register with 
authorities be denied certification indicating them as 
providing a safe shopping experience.109 While online 
marketplaces (ISPs) themselves may not qualify as 
food retailers in their own right, they potentially 
host hundreds or thousands of food offers by third-
party sellers. With the existing legislation in place, a 
diligent marketplace operator could for example be 
asked to have verification processes in place to check 
such registration. This could become even more 
important where marketplaces take on distribution 
services such as storage and shipping for individual 
sellers, and therefore affect the supply chain of the 
products themselves (such as done by Amazon or 
eBay shipping programme, or other food delivery 
platforms). Linking seller recruitment (or on-
boarding) to a verification of local registration and/
or an official trust mark could be one way forward 
to proving due care. Moreover, given the detailed 
labelling and information requirements imposed by 
legislation, both in food and pharmaceutical online 
retail, it will be increasingly difficult for a diligent 
marketplace operator to claim no actual knowledge 
over the products that are sold on their platforms. 
A reputable online seller would demand from 
its content host and platform operator that their 
offer be optimised in a way that allows consistent 
display of legally required information. A diligent 
marketplace operator would need to give the 
107 ‘EU Food Additives Database’ <https://webgate.ec.europa.
eu/foods_system/main/?event=display> accessed 27 March 
2017. and Regulation (EC) No 1333/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on food 
additives. Annexes IV and V.
108 Peter Kranz and others, ‘G@ZIELT – Erfahrungen aus zwei 
Jahren Kontrolle des Onlinehandels von Lebensmitteln, 
Futtermitteln, Bedarfsgegenständen, kosmetischen Mitteln 
und Tabak’ (2015) 10 Journal für Verbraucherschutz und 
Lebensmittelsicherheit 231. p. 232.
109 Kranz, Harms and Kuhr (n 102).
seller the opportunity to display this information. 
Arguably, this would entail awareness of the kind 
of information that needs to be displayed in a given 
product category and ensue making decisions on 
the layout and display of the information online. 
This information would necessarily give the ISP 
more knowledge and tools to effectively audit for 
infringing offers, even in a highly automated context.
III. Non-conforming 
electronic products
27 Consumer electronics are usually subject to CE 
marking as a sign that the product conforms with 
necessary technical and safety standards. Without 
such CE marking products may not be placed on 
the EU market. The primary liability for product 
conformity and safety lies with the entity that 
places the product on the EU market. Depending on 
the kind of product, consumer electronics may be 
subject to the Low Voltage Directive (LVD), the Radio 
Equipment Directive (RED), or the Electromagnetic 
Compatibility (EMC) Directives,110 which all require 
CE Marking.111 Apart from that, the products are 
subject to the provisions of the General Product 
Safety Directive (GPSD).112 The GPSD was enacted 
in 2001, only one year after the ECD and did not 
contain any cross reference to the latter. However 
the ECD in Recital 11 applies without prejudice to 
the public health and consumer interests laid down 
in the (predecessor of) the GPSD.113 When looking 
at the roles platforms play in enabling making 
product offers available to a wider public, it could 
be argued that they would fall within the scope of 
what the GPSD defines as a distributor.114 According 
110 Directive 2014/35/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to the making 
available on the market of electrical equipment designed 
for use within certain voltage limits (recast) 2014., Directive 
2014/53/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 April 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to the making available on the 
market of radio equipment and repealing Directive 1999/5/
EC 2014., Directive 2014/30/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the harmonisation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to electromagnetic 
compatibility (recast) 2014.
111 Specific requirements relating to CE Marking are laid out 
in Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements 
for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the 
marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 
339/93 2008.”plainCitation”:”Regulation (EC
112 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety 2001.
113 Council Directive 92/59/EEC of 29 June 1992 on general 
product safety 1992.
114 GPSD (n 112). Article 2 (f) defines a distributor as any 
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to the GPSD, a distributor would need to “act with 
due care to help to ensure compliance with the 
applicable safety requirements, in particular by not 
supplying products which they know or should have 
presumed, on the basis of the information in their 
possession and as professionals, do not comply with 
those requirements”.115 This throws up a potential 
conflict with the liability provisions in ECD Articles 
12-14. It is complicated by the fact that Recital 21 
ECD excludes from the scope of the coordinated 
field “Member States’ legal requirements relating to 
goods such as safety standards, labelling obligations, 
or liability for goods”. In today’s context this is 
confusing if one considers the role platforms play in 
providing technical means for optimising the display 
of information on products. In fact, marketplace 
platforms have been approached by market 
surveillance authorities with requests to assist in 
the identification and removal of non-compliant 
products in various regulated product groups.
28 As indicated above, there is a strong link between 
counterfeit products and safety risks. Typical 
counterfeit products which pose a risk to safety 
are for example chargers for portable devices such 
as mobile phones or tablet PCs, or mobile phones 
with non-compliant lithium batteries. However, 
genuine products may also be subject to safety 
and conformity problems, due to manufacturing 
errors. Furthermore, there are also products that 
are straightforwardly illegal for example due to their 
capacity to interfere with the operation of other 
devices (i.e. radio jammers). Consumer electronics 
are a very difficult market to control: for one, the 
regulatory requirements are often specific and 
technical; secondly, the product variety is immense 
which complicates regulatory risk assessment; 
thirdly, technical innovation and fashion trends 
foster frequent product replacement; and lastly 
there are a number of high value OEM brands which 
have facilitated a very lucrative accessories market. 
This lends itself to legitimate cheap and innovative 
competition, but also to counterfeit and non-
compliant products. In the EU market surveillance 
authorities have stirred into action with regards to 
the sale of consumer electronics online. In the UK, 
Ofcom, the telecoms regulator, in connection with 
Trading Standards the local market surveillance 
authority, regularly monitors the sites of major 
online marketplaces for products in violation of the 
RED and EMC Directives and they work with these 
platforms on the removal of these products.116 In 
professional in the supply chain whose activity does not affect the 
safety properties of a product.
115 Ibid. Article 5 (2).
116 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 
‘UK National Market Surveillance Programme January 
2016 - January 2017’ <https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539110/
Germany, the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA), 
which enforces the EMC and RED Directives evaluated 
and withdrew over 988,000 products sold via the 
internet in 2016 alone.117 Where it cannot make a 
decision from simply viewing the offer on online 
marketplaces, such as eBay or Amazon, it conducts 
test purchases. Subsequently, it requests takedowns 
of the offer and may enforce directly against the seller 
by requesting information from the marketplace. 
The new focus on online sales has been reflected in 
the recently recast EMC and RED Directives. Both 
Directives included a new Recital, which explicitly 
mentions that they should apply to all forms of 
supply, including distance selling. Other recent EU 
product regulation appears to include e-commerce 
more systematically in its scope: in contrast to its 
earlier version, the recast Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment118 (WEEE) now clarifies that 
distance sellers are subject to the same recycling and 
takeback obligations as offline businesses. It rectifies 
the first WEEE Directive, that had caused disparity 
in the law across member states and unequal 
treatment between online and offline retailers.119 
Meanwhile the also recast Directive specifying 
energy consumption labelling and information for 
energy-related products now explicitly imposes 
information and labelling requirements on internet 
based sellers.120 While these measures concern a 
priori sellers, and not platforms, the effect on the 
latter is obvious. As has been shown, surveillance 
authorities use large marketplace operators due 
to their position as gatekeepers and enablers to 
enforce the law and follow up on non-compliant 
offers and sellers. For some of the mandatory 
information and labelling requirements, platforms 
would inevitably act as facilitators of compliance 
by providing the technical means allowing the 
seller to display statutory information online (as 
demonstrated above for labelling requirements with 
regards to food or energy consumption labelling). 
Cooperation in this area could provide a useful basis 
for developing technical quality standards and due 
diligence process for the on-boarding of sellers. In 
BIS-16-115UKNMSP-UK-National-Market-Surveillance-
Programme.pdf> accessed 17 February 2017. p. 20.
117 Bundesnetzagentur, ‘Statistik Der Marktüberwachung 
2016’ <https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/DE/Sachgebiete/Telekommunikation/
Verbraucher/WeitereThemen/Marktueberwachung/
StatistikMarktueberwachung2016.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=3> accessed 20 March 2017. pp.6-9.
118 Directive 2012/19/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 4 July 2012 on waste electrical and electronic 
equipment (WEEE) Text with EEA relevance 2012.
119 Ibid. see for further detail Recital 7.
120 Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 May 2010 on the indication by labelling and 
standard product information of the consumption of energy 
and other resources by energy-related products 2010.; 
Article 7 specifically relates to energy label information 
provided through Distance selling and other forms of selling.
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addition, it is possible to make it mandatory for 
sellers to display information required by law and 
install processes to screen out non-compliant offers 
at an early stage.
29 In 2007, an EU Commission sponsored study on the 
Liability of ISPs recommended using standardisation 
based on the “New Approach” co-regulatory model 
in the area of product safety to tackle the challenge 
of content liability on online platforms. According 
to this the EU could mandate standardisation 
committees to develop due diligence standards 
based on available filtering technology, dependent 
on the area of infringement. Rights holders and 
ISPs would conjointly develop these standards. 
ISPs using these standards could eventually rely 
on liability defences, while the others could face 
“comprehensive filtering injunctions”.121 Economic 
efficiency theory would see ISPs, which are nearest 
to the technical information and most apt to control 
access to it, as the “cheapest cost avoider” and therefore 
most suitable to administer prevention technologies 
based on agreed industry standards.122
30 Based on this logic, Helman and Parchomovsky 
advocated for “best available technology standards” 
in the area of copyright infringement prevention. 
It would serve as a “technological safe harbour”123 
if used by ISPs and it would entirely replace current 
safe harbour provisions.124 Alternatively, third party 
copyright clearing houses could be employed to 
maintain and develop filtering technology and offer 
their services to ISPs.125
31 Apart from the economic reasoning, however, it 
also makes sense from a purely moral standpoint to 
involve ISPs more in the infringement prevention 
and developing standards for duty of care. As noted 
above, their growing role as information gatekeepers 
has led to calls for a definition of specific corporate 
responsibilities and an ethical framework for ISPs.126 
Duty of care principles based on sector specific 
standards, it is submitted, could be one cornerstone 
of such moral responsibilities.
121 Thibault Verbiest and others, ‘Study on the Liability of 
Internet Intermediaries, Markt 2006/09/E’. pp. 20-23.
122 Ibid.
123 Lital Helman and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘The Best Available 
Technology Standard’ [2011] Columbia Law Review 1194.
124 Ibid. Note the authors apply this to the US safe harbour in 
section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.
125 Ibid. Note that the proposal also tackles the issue of fair use.
126 See Taddeo and Floridi (n 9)., Valcke, Kuczerawy and 
Ombelet (n 9)., Vedder (n 6)., Pasquale (n 9).
IV. Horizontal anti-money 
laundering compliance
32 The above assertions can be backed up by yet 
another development in the area of due diligence, 
which touches on e-commerce companies. In the 
recent public consultation on the enforcement 
environment of IPRs, rights-holders criticised a 
poor implementation of Article 5 ECD citing a lack 
of know-your-customer (KYC) obligations applied 
to intermediaries.127 While Article 5 ECD refers only 
to the information Member States may require of 
ISPs, it appears rights holders lament the fact that 
intermediaries do not sufficiently verify the identity 
of their customers (merchants, users, uploaders). 
The comment appears to relate to a horizontal 
obligation that already applies to financial 
institutions in the EU and across the OECD as part 
of anti-money laundering (AML) legislation. In the 
EU, financial and credit institutions are obliged 
to apply due diligence measures to customers by 
verifying their identity through document checks, 
establishing beneficiary ownership and conducting 
ongoing transaction and client status monitoring 
using a risk-based approach.128 Electronic payment 
services, some of which are owned by or closely 
connected to leading online platforms,129 are covered 
by this legislation and hence would perform these 
due diligence measures already when on-boarding 
merchants. There is so far little official appreciation 
or experience in linking due diligence measures 
used in AML with risk management in for example 
counterfeit detection. However, large e-commerce 
platforms may manage the entire payment 
transaction process for sellers or content providers 
or charge them service or transaction fees using 
payment card service providers such as MasterCard 
or VISA.130 Linking KYC due diligence from the AML 
area with duty of care in the area of e-commerce 
for physical goods, where infringement prevention 
127 EU Commission, ‘Summary of Responses to the Public 
Consultation on the Evaluation and Modernisation of the 
Legal Framework for IPR Enforcement’, 14 September 
2016, <http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/18661> 
accessed 25 August 2017. p.17.
128 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European parliament and of 
the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purposes of money laundering 
or terrorist financing 2015. Article 13.
129 Amazon Payments Europe is registered as an electronic 
money institution and Paypal Europe as a credit institution 
with the Luxembourg financial market regulator (CSSF), 
while Google Payment Ltd has an E-Money issuer license 
with the UK Financial Conduct Authority.
130 J Bruce Richardson, ‘With Great Power Comes Little 
Responsibility: The Role of Online Payment Service Providers 
with Regards to Websites Selling Counterfeit Goods’ (2014) 
12 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology <https://ojs.
library.dal.ca/CJLT/article/view/6607> accessed 20 March 
2017.
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is particularly tricky, could prove a useful tool to 
bolster duty of care standards.
D. Conclusion
33 There is a correct recognition on the part of the 
EU that ISPs will need to be asked to bear more 
responsibilities for the content they host, especially 
when they derive economic gains from it. Both 
from an economic and moral perspective this claim 
seems justified. The EU legislator is trying to tackle 
the challenges posed by the platform economy 
and infringing content through a problem-driven, 
sectoral approach, while leaving the current 
intermediary liability regime of the ECD intact.
34 The legislative proposal in the area of copyright 
however, is ill fitted to achieve this. Article 13 of the 
copyright directive proposal risks undermining the 
current liability regime by potentially disqualifying 
a large number of ISPs from the hosting defence 
available under Article 14 ECD. Meanwhile, the 
quasi mandating of filtering technology just pays 
lip service to the general monitoring preclusion 
of Article 15 ECD. With filtering technology 
becoming indeed increasingly potent, it is moreover 
questionable whether it is worth insisting on the 
difference between specific preventive filtering 
and general monitoring. Then forcing information 
sharing duties on intermediaries, which risk 
exposing company confidential data, would do 
more to alienate stakeholders rather than bringing 
them together. Nowhere in this draft can we find the 
formerly promoted self- or co-regulatory approach 
to form codes of conduct or standards. An alternative 
and forward looking proposal, it is submitted, would 
replace the current liability regime with a technology 
based duty of care standard which could serve as a 
safe harbour.131
35 In the area of child protection, hate speech and 
fake news, the EU risks fragmenting its approach 
by focussing on VSPs with a similarly restrictive 
legislative proposal, while promoting purely self-
regulatory efforts for non-audiovisual content. The 
newly proposed Article 28a engages in a similar 
squaring of the circle attempt with regards to 
infringement prevention as does the proposed 
copyright directive. The risk is that the majority 
of VSPs lose their hosting liability exemption. 
Technology, it is suggested, is about to erase the 
dividing between specific and general prevention. 
The use of ERGA may help to promote new codes 
131 As for example suggested in Verbiest and others 
(n 121).
of conduct and standards, but the efforts need to 
cover the entire ISP sector in the area of hate speech 
and child protection in a consistent form. It will be 
even more effective if ISPs are encouraged to share 
their knowledge through the propagation of “Good 
Samaritan” principles.
36 Meanwhile political developments appear to drive 
national policy action in the area of fake news and 
hate speech. This area demonstrates the change 
in perception of the role online platforms play 
as gatekeepers and power brokers when it comes 
to access to information and speech. Political 
voices have been blunter when pinning down 
the responsibilities and threatening enforcement 
action against platforms failing to react quickly to 
remove and prevent infringing content regarding 
hate speech and so-called fake news. Although 
the true impact of fake news is not proven, it is 
encouraging that codes of conduct are being defined 
and that third party, independent co-regulatory 
mechanisms are used to screen online content. 
However, asking platforms to react independently 
to “obviously” infringing content in addition, and 
without detailed recourse mechanisms in place, 
risks giving way to private censorship. The same 
risk applies to all of the sectoral areas mentioned 
above, as it is not clear how codes of conduct (if at 
all encouraged) are being reviewed and tested for 
their impartiality. This is even a greater risk for the 
area of trademark infringements, where, despite 
the EU’s self-professed problem-driven approach, 
no concrete policy action has been proposed. The 
current self-regulatory effort promoted through 
the Memorandum of Understanding on the sale of 
counterfeit goods via the internet has so far brought 
little progress. In an area where infringement 
detection is particularly difficult to master, a 
firmer grip by the EU Commission to promote and 
develop technical standards and risk management 
approaches would be welcome. Experience could 
be gained from the area of anti-money laundering 
compliance where mandated customer due diligence 
obligations exist.
37 The area of product regulation serves as a good 
example for the kind of independent, third party 
monitoring and standard setting that could help 
building knowledge and develop duty of care 
technical standards for combatting infringements. 
For example, the development of certification 
for online pharmacies gives market platforms a 
concrete tool they can apply when on-boarding new 
sellers and preventing the sale of fake medicines. 
Similarly, standards for labelling, online product 
display, and company registration in various areas 
(food, electronic products) can constitute means for 
platform operators to apply due diligence in seller 
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on-boarding and product verification. These could 
develop into concrete Government and industry 
mandated due diligence standards. However, overly 
relying on self-regulatory industry agreement 
between rights-owners and powerful platforms 
risks restricting rather than promoting diversity 
and expression on online platforms.
38 It is submitted that a new approach, recognising 
the moral and economic arguments for increased 
responsibilities of ISPs is needed, resulting in an 
ethical framework or corporate social responsibilities 
for information gatekeepers.132 The cat and mouse 
game of ex-post versus ex ante and specific versus 
broad monitoring provisions could be replaced 
by technology based duty of care safe harbours 
which relate to specific areas of infringement. As 
online platforms transform more and more areas 
of previously offline economy sectors, it may be 
time to take some lessons from the offline world 
regarding regulation and apply them to ISPs. It could 
be a way to achieve the EU’s vision of a “responsible 
behaviour of platforms to protect core values”.133 
Coming back to 1995, the thread of standardisation 
certainly needs to be taken up, but it could be that 
internet intermediary regulation itself may fade 
into sector specific rules, with just an overarching, 
horizontal commitment towards using the best code 
available as a standard to contain risk.
† This paper was prepared for the 2017 Annual Conference 
of the British and Irish Law, Education and Technology 
Association (BILETA) held in April 2017 at the University 
of Minho, Braga, Portugal, where it won the award of the 
BILETA Executive Committee.
132 Taddeo and Floridi (n 9).
133 EU Commission, ‘COM(2016) 288 Final’ (n 14). p. 5.
